De Havilland Dhc Safety Record

The failure of both pilots to see and avoid the other airplane. Contributing to the accident were (1) the PA-12 pilot’s decision to fly with a known severe vision deficiency that had resulted in denial of his most recent application for medical certification and (2) the Federal Aviation Administration’s absence of a requirement for airborne traffic advisory systems with aural alerting among operators who carry passengers for hire.

The pilot’s inadequate compensation for a quartering tailwind during a water landing, which resulted in a loss of control and subsequent nose-over. Contributing to the accident was the company’s inadequate operational control of the flight release process, which resulted in assignment of an inexperienced pilot to a commuter seaplane flight.

The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, which prevented the two pilots from seeing the other airplane before the collision, and the absence of visual and aural alerts from both airplanes’ traffic display systems, while operating in a geographic area with a high concentration of air tour activity. Contributing to the accident were (1) the Federal Aviation Administration’s provision of new transceivers that lacked alerting capability to Capstone Program operators without adequately mitigating the increased risk associated with the consequent loss of the previously available alerting capability and (2) the absence of a requirement for airborne traffic advisory systems with aural alerting among operators who carry passengers for hire.

The NTSB did not determine the probable cause of this event and does not plan to issue an investigative report or open a public docket. The investigation of this event is being conducted under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Impact with terrain for reasons that could not be determined because the airplane was not recovered due to the inaccessible nature of the accident site.

The pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during departure climb, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's improper decision to load the airplane beyond its allowable gross weight and center of gravity limits, coupled with his lack of operational experience in the airplane make, model, and configuration.

The pilot's failure to retract the landing gear wheels prior to performing a water landing. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's disabling of the landing gear warning/advisory system and possible fatigue due to his work schedule.

An inadvertent aerodynamic stall resulting from the pilot's poor decision-making and inadequate planning and execution when he took off toward nearby rising terrain, in strong winds, under circumstances where his options for maneuvering were severely limited and where his safety margin was, thus, insufficient.

The pilot's decision to continue under visual flight rules into an area of instrument metrological conditions. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's inadequate weather evaluation, and the FAA's inadequate surveillance of the commercial air tour operator.

The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed while maneuvering to reverse direction, which resulted in an inadvertent stall and an uncontrolled descent. Factors associated with the accident were the inadvertent stall and wind gusts.

The pilot's continued VFR flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in an in-flight collision with mountainous terrain. A factor associated with the accident was a low cloud ceiling.

the pilot's failure to maintain airspeed following a loss of power in the right engine due to the fracturing of compressor turbine blades for undetermined reasons. Contributing to some parachutists' injuries was the lack of a more effective restraint system on the airplane.