Boeing 737 Safety Record

The flightcrew's inadequate in-flight planning and decision, and their failure to refer to the navaids needed for the instrument approach procedure. A factor was the lack of a minimum safe altitude warning from approach control.

failure of the pilot to maintain directional control and runway alignment, during the landing roll out. Factors relating to the incident were: darkness, the adverse weather condition, the wet runway, and reduced visibility due to the inadvertent encounter with heavy rain.

failure of the nose gear taxi light support bracket due to in service damage, which resulted in debris being ingested by the engines. Contributing to the accident was the failure of company maintenance personnel to comply with a Grimes Service Bulletin and a Boeing Service Letter which recommended changing the nose gear taxi light support bracket to an improved design.

excessive airspeed was maintained by the captain during the approach/landing phase of the flight, which resulted in an overrun and an encounter with soft/wet terrain. Factors relating to the incident were: the pilot's failure to attain the proper touchdown point, the wet runway condition, and partial failure of the anti-skid brake system.

installation of an incorrect bearing in the number three main wheel by the wheel assembly supplier, which led to subsequent failure of the wheel bearing and separation of the wheel during takeoff.

IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE 'A' SYSTEM FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER BY COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, WHICH RESULTED IN PIN CONNECTOR(S) BEING PUSHED LOOSE AND SUBSEQUENT MALFUNCTION OF THE AUTOPILOT.

FAILURE OF THE FLIGHTCREWS OF THE BOEING 737, N675AA, AND THE CESSNA 401, N31DB, TO SEE AND AVOID EACH OTHER. FACTORS WERE: THE FAILURE OF 737 FLIGHTCREW TO RESPOND TO THE TRAFFIC ADVISORY GIVEN BY THE GROUND CONTROLLER IDENTIFYING POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING TRAFFIC, AND THE FAILURE OF THE GROUND CONTROLLER TO ISSUE SEQUENCING INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH AIRCRAFT.

CONTAMINATION OF THE WIRING HARNESS AND ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS TO THE E-1-2 AND E-1-3 SHELF DISCONNECT BRACKETS IN THE ELECTRONICS COMPARTMENT, WHICH RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL FAULT AND AN UNCOMMANDED ROLL MALFUNCTION OF THE AUTOPILOT. A FACTOR RELATING TO THE INCIDENT WAS: INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE INSPECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT BY COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.

PROPER DESCENT RATE NOT MAINTAINED BY THE FIRST OFFICER, RESULTING IN A HARD LANDING. FACTORS WERE UNFAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS AND THE CAPTAIN'S INADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF THE FIRST OFFICER.

the inadequacy or deterioration of lubricating grease in the wheel bearing, which led to the total bearing failure and subsequent loss of the wheel. Factors were the insufficiently defined procedures for repacking the bearing, along with an insufficient method of retaining lubricant within the bearing.

maintenance personnel inadvertently overservicing the left main landing gear strut with nitrogen that, during rotation with the aircraft weight on the strut reduced, gave the pilots a rolling sensation to the right.

THE INADEQUATE INSPECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT BY OTHER MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, IN THAT THEY DID NOT PROPERLY DIAGNOSE DISCREPANCIES IN THE ANTISKID BRAKING SYSTEM.

AN INADEQUATE PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING OF WHEEL CHOCKS BY COMPANY MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS PERSONNEL. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACCIDENT WERE AN INADEQUATE INSPECTION OF THE AIRPLANE BY COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, AND AN INADEQUATE PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION BY THE CO-PILOT.