Boeing 737 Safety Record

the flight crew's failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to the incident was the flight crew's self-induced pressure to heed the takeoff clearance during a period of increased workload.

A complete failure and depressurization of both hydraulic systems due to two separate events: 1) the failure of a engine driven pump on the 'A' system, and 2) the fatigue fracture and failure of a hydraulic line on the 'B' system.

The pilot's inadvertent application of the left brakes at touchdown. Contributing to the incident was insufficient information in the quick reference handbook on the loss of touchdown protection with an inoperative anti-skid system.

The airplane tug driver's inadvertent movement of the tug gear shift lever from forward to reverse, which resulted in the nose landing gear collapse. Contributing to the accident was the defective gear shift lever.

The foreign object damage to the horizontal stabilizer during taxi as a result of improper airport maintenance by contract maintenance personnel. The aluminum plate was a factor.

the mechanic's failure to maintain proper clearance with the engine intake during a jet engine run, and the failure of contract maintenance personnel to follow written procedures and directives contained in the airline's general maintenance manual. Factors contributing to the accident were the insufficient training provided to the contract mechanics by the airline, and the failure of the airport to disseminate a policy prohibiting ground engine runs above idle power in the terminal area.

The pilots' failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted in a runway overrun. This failure occurred because the pilots' first experience and lack of familiarity with the airplane's autobrake system distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the challenging landing. Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airline's 1) failure to provide its pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies and procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations; 2) programming and design of its onboard performance computer, which did not present inherent assumptions in the program critical to pilot decision making; 3) plan to implement new autobrake procedures without a familiarization period; and 4) failure to include a margin of safety in the arrival assessment to account for operational uncertainties. Also contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to divert to another airport given reports that included poor braking action and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the absence of an engineering materials arresting system, which was needed because of the limited runway safety area beyond the departure end of runway 31C.

The pilot's improper touchdown and recovery from a bounced landing. Factors to the accident were the operator's failure to provide sufficient information on the use of autothrottles and bounced landing recovery techniques, along with the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require the inclusion of mixed-mode flight control guidance and bounced landing recovery techniques in operator pilot training programs and flight manuals.

the local controller's failure to monitor the operation and recognize a developing traffic conflict which resulted in a loss of separation between USA1251 and ComAir 5026. Contributing to the accident was the controller's incorrect prioritization of his workload.

The pushback tow driver not maintaining visual lookout for the wing walker's visual signal, and the driver not maintaining clearance from the vehicle during the pushback for taxi. Factors to the accident were the standing vehicle behind the airplane, the inadequate group/crew coordination for the pushback, and the lack of guidance in the company's manuals to stop the tow when visual lookout is not maintained.

the left wing walker's failure to maintain an adequate visual lookout. Contributing factors were his inadequate initial training, and the failure of other ground personnel to follow company procedures/directives.